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Executive summary  
 
Highly potent synthetic opioids like fentanyl and its derivatives are a growing concern in Europe. Since 
2009, 57 new synthetic opioids have been detected on Europe's drug market — including eight reported for 
the first time in 2019. In 2019 only two of these opioids were fentanyl derivatives. This is the first time that 
more novel non-fentanyl synthetic opioids than fentanyl-derivatives were identified (EMCDDA, 2020a). 
New synthetic opioids pose a high risk of overdose to consumers, because they are often much more 
potent than ‘traditional’ opioids like heroin. 
In the United States, the opioid epidemic has been called the "most consequential preventable public 
health problem." Drug overdoses are the leading cause of death among Americans under the age of fifty-
five, and synthetic opioids (mainly fentanyl and its analogues) are responsible for most of these deaths. 
Also in Canada the numbers of synthetic opioid-related deaths are very high.  
There is a growing concern that similar developments might occur in Europe. Fentanyl-related deaths have 
been increasing in some European countries in recent years (EMCDDA, 2019a). With Europe being a mosaic 
of different countries, cultures, and health systems, European countries can try to learn from each other’s 
experiences. The project SO-PREP aims to strengthen European countries' preparedness and response to 
the threat and potential harm from potent synthetic opioids. 
The aim of this report is to explore existing strategies and good practices of preparedness for dealing with a 
potential synthetic opioid crisis in Europe, and to identify needs and challenges and propose 
recommendations to strengthen EU Members States’ synthetic opioid preparedness. 
The first part of the report provides a brief overview of the synthetic opioid situation in the US and in 
Europe, followed by a description of various tools for monitoring synthetic opioids on the European level. 
This is based on review of available literature, research reports, and publications of the EMCDDA. 
The second part of the report is based on a survey among the EMCDDA Reitox network of national focal 
points, which was carried out in 2020 as part of the SO-PREP project. The survey aimed at mapping existing 
strategies of synthetic opioid preparedness in different EU countries. The main finding from the survey is 
that most EU countries do not seem to have concrete plans for preparing for or responding to possible 
increases in synthetic opioids and related harms. However it should be noted that the responses were 
somewhat limited and not necessarily comprehensive. 
The third part of the report presents examples of good practices on synthetic opioids preparedness as well 
as conclusions drawn from this report. With the rapidly changing drug markets and ever-growing number of 
new synthetic opioids, countries need to be vigilant and would benefit from developing multi-faceted and 
multi-disciplinary preparedness plans. The review of the literature shows that plenty of effective tools are 




PART 1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1. Synthetic opioids and preparedness in the USA  
The United States (US) has experienced three waves of the opioid crisis over the past two decades: the first 
was mostly related to prescription painkillers, the second to heroin and the third to highly potent synthetic 
opioids such as fentanyl (CDC, 2019). Fatal overdoses involving synthetic opioids in the US have increased 
dramatically, from approximately 3,000 in 2013 to more than 30,000 in 2018. The spread of fentanyl and 
other synthetic opioids differs fundamentally from past drug epidemics, in that synthetic opioids drive up 
deaths rather than the number of users (Pardo et al., 2019). 
As the opioid crisis worsens globally, the emergence of fentanyl, fentanyl analogs and novel synthetic 
opioids poses a serious threat to the population at large (Armenian et al., 2017). What are the implications 
for public health practice? Surveillance of trends in overdoses and the illicit drug supply is vital to track 
emerging threats. Additionally, a multisectoral response, including enhanced linkage to treatment, is critical 
to reduce and prevent opioid-related deaths (Wilson, Kariisa, Seth, Smith IV, Davis, 2020). 
In the US, two key programs that identify and monitor emerging drug problems and trends are the National 
Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS) and the National Drug Early Warning System (NDEWS). The 
NFLIS is a program of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (USDEA) Diversion Control Division that 
systematically collects drug identification results and associated information from drug encounters 
analyzed by federal, state and local forensic laboratories. The NDEWS monitors emerging illicit drug trends 
by analyzing social or news media and by site visits to local communities, as well as collaboration with the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers (Jannetto et al., 2019).  
The US Department of Homeland Security is working with its partners to stop the flow of illicit opioids 
before they reach US borders. They also focus on dismantling and destroying transnational criminal 
organizations, which smuggle illicit drugs across borders and towns (US Department of Homeland Security, 
2019). 
The US Customs and Border Protection ‘Strategy to Combat Opioids’ has four strategic goals:  
1. Enhance collaboration and information-sharing to combat illicit opioids.   
2. Produce actionable intelligence on illicit opioids.  
3. Target the opioid supply chain.  
4. Protect personnel from exposure to opioids (US Customs and Border Protection. CBP Strategy to 
Combat Opioids, 2019). 
 
Governments have the responsibility to fund data collection and monitor trends in drug use and drug 
market indicators. Pardo et al argue (2019) that at one time, the US had the world's best drug data 
infrastructure for supporting evidence-informed decision making. Now, it lags behind. In Europe, some 
countries regularly test wastewater to monitor and track drug consumption trends. The US has not made 
this a priority even if improving surveillance and monitoring trends and market indicators are crucial (Pardo 
et al., 2019).  
One of the big challenges in preventing opioid-related deaths in the US is the fierce political resistance to 
implementation and scale-up of harm reduction services. The opioid epidemic is occurring in suburban and 
rural areas without harm reduction services, such as take-home naloxone programmes, drug consumption 
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rooms, drug testing, and opioid substitution treatment. There is a clear need for the expansion of these 
services to suburban and rural areas as well as in the cities all over the country (Des Jarlais, 2017). 
2. Drug markets  
It appears that most of the new fentanils coming into Europe and North America originate from China. 
Production in illicit laboratories in Europe has also been reported more recently. 
Like other new substances, one of the reasons behind the increase in these fentanils is that they are not 
controlled under the United Nations drug control conventions. This means that in many countries they can 
be manufactured and traded relatively freely and openly — a situation which has been exploited by 
criminal groups using companies based in China to make these substances. China has been the principal 
source of the world’s illicit fentanyl. Fentanils are typically shipped to Europe and North America by express 
mail services and courier services. They are sold as 'legal' replacements for illicit opioids on the surface web 
and the darknet. Unknown to users, they are sometimes also sold as heroin, fake medicines, or mixed with 
other illicit opioids (Evans-Brown and Sedefov, 2018). 
Growing awareness about the individual and public health risks associated with fentanyl derivatives has 
resulted in actions that include increased restrictions in producer countries. The Chinese government 
banned the production and sale of fentanyl and many of its derivatives in May 2019. There are signs that 
the market adapted accordingly. In 2019, for the first time, more non-fentanyl synthetic opioids were 
reported to the EU Early Warning System than fentanyl-derivatives. Of the eight synthetic opioids detected 
for the first time in 2019, six were not fentanyl derivatives. However, they may present a similar threat to 
public health (EMCDDA, 2020a).  
The new synthetic opioid ‘isotonitazene’ was recently detected as the first member of the new 
benzimidazole class of opioids. The benzimidazole class is etonitazene with an estimated potency of 
hundred to a thousand times that of morphine, thus making it a very potent opioid. Moreover, data 
indicates that this compound is being sold undiluted, which makes it very dangerous to use this substance 
(Blanckaert et al., 2020). 
Synthetic opioids are easy to conceal and transport because tiny amounts produce a large number of doses. 
Another area of concern is the appearance of novel dosage forms, such as nasal sprays and e-liquids for 
vaping in electronic cigarettes, making fentanils easier to use and possibly more socially acceptable than 
injecting (EMCDDA, 2017; Tabarra, Soares, Rosado et al., 2019; Evans-Brown and Sedefov, 2018). 
3. Synthetic opioids and preparedness in Europe 
Over the last few years, there has been a sharp increase in the availability of new synthetic opioids, such as 
fentanyl and its derivatives, also in Europe. At the end of 2019 the European Monitoring Center for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) was monitoring around 790 new psychoactive substances (NPS), of which 57 
were synthetic opioids (EMCDDA, 2020a). While synthetic opioids are not the largest group of NPS, they are 
generally associated with the highest risk of overdose of all NPS. 
Opioids are the main driver of fatal overdoses in Europe. It is estimated that there were 1.3 million high-risk 
opioid users in the European Union in 2017. In 2017 there were 9461 overdose deaths in the 28 EU 
member states plus Norway and Turkey; 78% of these deaths involved opioids. Deaths associated with 
fentanyl and its analogs are probably underestimated, and outbreaks of deaths related to these substances 
have been reported (EMCDDA, 2019a). 
Fentanyl and fentanyl analogs have evolved into a global public health threat. It is important to understand 
the analytical, clinical, and regulatory efforts needed to assist communities affected by the current 
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synthetic opioid epidemic and to prepare communities who are at risk of developing a synthetic opioid 
crisis. According to Jannetto et al. (2017), the EMCDDA has encountered several new fentanyl analogues 
(FAs) in the heroin supply. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals containing mixtures of fentanyl and FAs continue to 
be a poorly recognized global problem despite the WHO classifying several FAs as a serious threat to public 
health (Jannetto, Helander, Garg, Janis, Goldberger, Ketha, 2017). 
In Europe, Council Decision 2005/387/JHA provides a 3-step legal framework of early warning, risk 
assessment and control measures that allow the European Union to rapidly detect, assess, and respond to 
public health threats caused by new substances. The EMCDDA is responsible for the first two steps in this 
system, namely operating an early warning system together with Europol (the EU police agency) and 
conducting risk assessments. The European Commission, European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union are responsible for control measures. In European countries, initial responses to the emergence of 
new psychoactive substances have been predominantly regulatory in nature, using legislative tools to 
reduce their supply (EMCDDA, 2017).  
4. EMCCDA preparedness and response to a fast-moving drugs problem 
The EMCDDA is an agency of the European Union (EU), which aims to provide factual, objective, reliable 
and comparable information on drugs and drug addiction. The EMCDDA, among other things, monitors 
drugs and emerging drug trends in Europe, provides information on best practices, and assesses the risk of 
NPS. The EMCDDA Reitox network of national focal points (the European information network on drugs and 
drug addiction) is a European reporting system that includes all 27 EU Member States, as well as Norway 
and Turkey, and incorporates multiple indicators alongside an early warning system (EWS) on NPS. While 
epidemiological information is based largely on registries, surveys and other routine data reported 
annually, the EWS collects case‐based data on an ongoing basis (Mounteney, Griffiths, Sedefov, Noor, 
Vicente, Simon, 2016). 
5. Early Warning Systems 
An Early Warning System (EWS) on drugs is a multidisciplinary, inter-institutional network that enables 
information exchange among key actors, which are directly or indirectly involved in the field of drugs. An 
EWS aims to identify early on events of emerging drugs that pose a potential threat to public health. It 
assesses the risks that such drugs may pose and provides information to enable the design of effective 
responses. An EWS can help identify the emergence of new drug threats and changes on the drug market, 
such as new use patterns, unusual concentrations or contents such as toxic adulterants. Such events 
provide valuable information to an EWS network. 
EWS are established in order to be able to address the rapidly changing availability and use of emerging 
drug threats. An EWS does not only support early detection of new substances but helps to disseminate 
information on new drugs, new drug use patterns and availability or market trends. Scientific evidence-
based information of the changing drug market is essential in making informed policy decisions to address 
any changes and protect public health from possible health threats and drug related criminality (UNODC, 
2020). 
Many governments have started establishing EWS at a national level. In addition to that, there are cross-
national EWS, including the EMCDDA’s EWS at the European level, and the UN’s EWS at a global level. Both 
the national systems and the European/global systems benefit from each other through enhanced 
information exchange. 
UN Early Warning System 
The UNODC developed the first international monitoring system on NPS under the umbrella of its Global 
Synthetics Monitoring: Analyses, Reporting and Trends (SMART) Programme. The UNODC Early Warning 
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Advisory (EWA) on NPS is a voluntary online data submission system. It serves as a platform for sharing 
relevant information on NPS (available at: www.unodc. org/nps). Registered users can access specific 
information on NPS, including trend data, chemical and pharmacological data on individual substances, 
supporting documentation on laboratory analysis and on legislative responses. In 2018, the EWA was 
enhanced to incorporate toxicological data, including information on adverse health consequences from 
the use of NPS (available at: www.unodc.org/tox). 
EU Early Warning System 
The European EWS is a mechanism for the rapid detection and exchange of information on NPS, preceding 
and informing risk assessments and responses to the health and social threats of these drugs (EMCDDA, 
2019d). The EWS aims to ensure that timely, accurate, and sufficiently detailed information on NPS reaches 
the public in a timely manner in order to allow them to take action to prevent or reduce the risk of harm 
(EMCDDA, 2019d). 
Operated by the EMCDDA, in close cooperation with Europol, the European EWS is the first step in a three-
step legal framework designed to allow the EU to rapidly detect, assess, and respond to health and social 
threats caused by NPS. The EWS aims to build, maintain, and strengthen situational awareness, 
preparedness, and response activities at national- and EU-level.  
The EWS is composed of a multiagency and multidisciplinary network, which includes the EMCDDA, 29 
national early warning systems (in 27 EU Member States, Turkey and Norway), Europol, and its law 
enforcement networks, the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Commission, and other 
partners. The EMCDDA, in cooperation with Europol, is responsible for collecting, collating, analyzing, 
assessing, and communicating the information reported by the network in order to provide them with any 
information required for the purposes of early warning and to allow the EMCDDA to draw up an initial 
report on an NPS that may pose health or social risks at EU level or a combined initial reports on several 
similar NPS. 
Underpinning each of the national early warning systems, and, in turn, the European EWS, is the exchange 
of information on the chemical identification of NPS from forensic and toxicology laboratories. Principally, 
these laboratories handle casework related to seizures of NPS by law enforcement agencies (such as police, 
customs, and border forces) from poisonings (such as those from hospital emergency departments and 
medico-legal death investigations), and from samples collected from people who use NPS and from test-
purchases, such as from online market places. These data may be supplemented by information from law 
enforcement agencies, health care systems, medicine agencies, key informants (such as users, owners and 
staff of clubs, and organizers of festivals), and open-source information (such as media reports and user 
discussion forums on the internet). 
This approach allows the collection, assessment and rapid reporting of event-based information on the 
appearance of, and harms caused by, NPS found at the national level to the EMCDDA. These data are 
complemented by biannual reports, which include aggregated data on seizures by law enforcement and 
from poisonings. The organization and functioning of the national early warning systems is a national 
responsibility. While these systems have developed to meet national needs, they draw on a common 
format, guidelines and tools to report information to the EMCDDA (EMCCDA, 2019d).  
INFO BOX 
Early warning systems are critical to protect health: 
 
Awareness ↑ Preparedness ↑ Responses↑ Harm ↓ (Michael Ewans-Brown, 2018.) 
 
EWS can play a central role in situational awareness, preparedness and responses to health 
threats caused by NPS. Yet, like all public health interventions, strengthening these systems is a 
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continuous process, and work remains to be done. The recent developments in the NPS market 
serves to highlight the importance of continued investment in strong early warning systems at 
both national and EU level, as well as a more rapid risk assessment process at EU level, in order 
to help protect the health and security of people living in Europe. (Ewans-Brown & Sedefov, 
2020:36.) 
 
Information sources at the national level might include (EMCDDA, 2019):   
 Law enforcement agencies and their laboratory networks responsible for the forensic 
analysis of seizures. These include police, specialized drug units, customs, border guards, 
prosecutors' offices, prisons, etc.  
 Analytical toxicology laboratories that are responsible for clinical case work that involves 
the analysis of biological samples, particularly those related to serious adverse events 
such as poisoning cases presenting to hospital emergency departments.  
 Forensic toxicology laboratories that are responsible for case work that involves the 
analysis of biological samples, particularly those related to medico-legal death 
investigations (such as post-mortem toxicology).  
 Poison centres and related toxic surveillance systems.  
 Health and care systems, including: hospital emergency departments, psychiatric 
departments, specialized and non-specialized treatment centres; outreach and street 
work agencies, drug prevention and harm reduction establishments, low-threshold 
services, drug helplines, general practitioners, etc.  
 Drug checking programmes.   
 National medicines regulatory authorities and the national pharmacovigilance systems. 
 Universities and research establishments.  
 Key informants, including: service users, organizers of mass gathering events (festivals, 
concerts, raves, etc.), owners and staff of clubs, etc. 
 Online fora where people who use NPS share experiences. 
 Scientific publications and grey literature; printed and electronic media.  
 
 
6. Risk assessments of new psychoactive substances 
Risk assessment of NPS supports decision-making on these novel substances at the EU level, as well as the 
national level.  
The EMCDDA has published risk-assessment operating guidelines to provide a sound methodological and 
procedural basis for carrying out a risk assessment, including providing a conceptual framework for 
consideration of risk. The risk assessment process reviews the possible health and social risks of the 
substance and the implications of placing it under control. The concept of risk includes both the element of 
probability that some harm may occur (usually defined as 'risk') and the degree of seriousness of such a 
harm (usually defined as 'hazard'). An assessment of the risk–benefit ratio of an NPS is also needed. Various 
factors, including the question of whether the substance has legitimate uses, such as potential therapeutic 
benefits, industrial use or other economic value, may be taken into account. The assessment uses the data 
reported by the network and identified by the EMCDDA through its other monitoring systems. 
Risk assessments are based on a broad range of available evidence, including recent unpublished data, the 
quality of which needs to be appraised. At the risk assessment stage, the prevalence of use of a new 
substance will usually be low, and the majority of the available information comes from forensic and 
toxicology laboratories, law enforcement agencies and anecdotal reports. Especially important are reports 
relating to non-fatal and fatal poisonings involving the substance under assessment. As data on the effects 
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of new substances is often extremely limited, part of the assessment involves an analysis of the possible 
nature and risks of the substance with reference to similar known substances, both controlled drugs and 
other substances. At the end of the risk assessment process a report on the substance is drawn up which 
contains an analysis of the information available, which includes chemistry and pharmacology, dependence 
producing potential and abuse liability, the health and social risks as well as the involvement of organised 
crime, and its production and distribution. Since 1997 and up until November 2020, the EMCDDA has 
conducted 33 risk assessments on NPS (EMCDDA, 2020c).  
7. Methods of rapid data collection for detecting the use of synthetic 
opioids 
There are many different data collection tools, from early warnings and public health alerts on new drugs, 
to risk assessments of drug-related infectious disease outbreaks or drug market threats, these innovative 
methods boost EMCDDA’s preparedness and response. Analyses of data from wastewater studies, hospital 
emergency departments, web surveys and drug-checking services enhance understanding of drug use and 
markets in Europe and can provide valuable information for local interventions. The monitoring of darknet 
markets and open source information may also help identify emerging trends and threats, while 
Trendspotter studies bring together multiple sources for rapid assessments of topics of concern. While 
these methods have their limitations, they can improve awareness of patterns of drug use and sub-
populations of users that are less well-observed (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. EMCDDA preparedness and response 
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The EMCCDA has continually strengthened and expanded its monitoring tools. Recently, the following new 
indicators have complemented earlier data sources: 
1. Hospital emergency data 
2. Preparedness strategies include identifying high-risk settings (like emergency departments) and 
individuals (high-risk opioid users) to facilitate linkage to appropriate services.  
3. Syringe residue analysis (the analysis of injected substances from the residual content of used 
syringes) 
4. Wastewater analysis in different European cities. 
5. Drug checking services 
6. Web surveys  
7. Seizure and forensic data from law enforcement sources 
8. Early warning and risk assessment supported by multidisciplinary data, including the chemical 
identification of new substances from forensic and toxicology laboratory networks. 
9. Risk communication with authorities, professionals and users related to particularly harmful new 
substances, new formats of use, and emerging health and social threats. (EMCDDA, 2019; Bagley, 
Schoenberger, Waye, Walley, 2019.) 
In the following part, we introduce some of the tools mentioned above in more detail. 
7.1 Wastewater analysis  
Monitoring illicit drug use is difficult because of the hidden and complex nature of drug using behaviours. 
'Wastewater analysis', or 'wastewater-based epidemiology', holds promise for complementing established 
methods of drug use measurement. Wastewater analysis is a rapidly developing scientific discipline with 
the potential for monitoring real-time data on geographical and temporal trends in illicit drug use. 
Wastewater analysis offers an interesting and complementary data source for monitoring the quantities of 
illicit drugs used at the population level, but it also has several limitations. Wastewater analysis cannot 
provide information on prevalence and frequency of use, route of administration, the main classes of users 
or the purity of the drugs (EMCDDA, 2020d). 
There are many uncertainties associated with wastewater analysis such as the behavior of the selected 
biomarkers in sewage, the reliability of interlaboratory analytical measurements, the different back-
calculation methods used and the different approaches used to estimate the size of the population being 
tested (Castiglioni et al. 2016). Furthermore translating the total consumed amounts into the 
corresponding number of average doses is complicated as drugs can be taken by different routes and in 
amounts that vary widely, and purity levels fluctuate (Zuccato, Chianrando, Caglioni, Baganti and Fanelli, 
2008). However, analysis methods are in the process of being improved (EMCDDA, 2020d). 
As a method, wastewater analysis has moved from being an experimental technique to being a new 
method in the epidemiological toolkit. Its rapid ability to detect new trends can help target public health 
programs and policy initiatives at specific groups of people and the different drugs they are using 
(EMCDDA, 2020d), Seventeen countries participated in the 2019 wastewater monitoring campaign: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey(EMCDDA, 2019b). 
7.2 Syringe residue analysis 
Syringe residue analysis is a method for gathering information on the substances used by people who inject 
drugs. The method can provide local and timely information that can be used for city-level monitoring and 
interventions. It complements existing monitoring tools (such as surveillance data from drug treatment 
centers) but does not replace them. The method provides timely local information on injected substances 
and patterns of injection to health and social services, allowing for the prompt response to potentially 
dangerous substances.   
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The pilot study of the ESCAPE project (European Syringe Collection and Analysis Project Enterprise) 
collected syringes in 2017 from the bins of street automatic injection kit dispensers and at harm-reduction 
services in a network of six sentinel European cities: Amsterdam, Budapest, Glasgow, Helsinki, Lausanne 
and Paris. (EMCDDA, 2019e)  
The ESCAPE approach provides local information that can be used for local interventions. 
7.3 Early Warning System 
By the end of December 2019, the EMCDDA was monitoring more than 790 NPS that appeared on Europe's 
drug market. 
Since 2012, a total of 57 new synthetic opioids have been detected on Europe's drug markets, including 
eight for the first time in 2019. In 2019 only two of these opioids were fentanyl derivatives, which is a small 
proportion when compared with previous years. This means that fentanyl derivatives have been replaced 
by other new synthetic opioids. These new, non-fentanyl synthetic opioids may pose similar concerns in 
terms of their toxicity.  
 
 
Figure 3: Number of NPS reported to the EU EWS 2000-2019 (EMCDDA, 2020a). 
 
7.4 Forensic Institutes and relevant laboratories 
Drug analysis laboratories are key to a functioning national, regional and international EWS due to the 
specific expertise, information and data they can generate (UNODC, 2020). Under the conditions of a 
globalized drug market, there is an increasing risk that novel potentially harmful NPS may spread to more 
countries and regions. This poses challenges for detecting, identifying and monitoring as well as controlling 
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these substances. Experts working at drug analysis laboratories are in a unique position to detect and 
identify both known and new chemical substances and changes in the drug markets (UNODC, 2020). 
In order to track drug trends, what is needed is high-quality, real-time, national-level data on chemical 
composition, toxicological test data, drug toxicity and overdoses, as well as the analysis of seized materials 
by law enforcement. The identification of novel compounds circulating in the illicit market as well as 
locations experiencing increases in overdoses and deaths is critical to assessing the evolving opioid 
epidemic. Furthermore, rapid communication of these data should follow model systems developed for 
seized drugs to share information and overcome the analytical challenges in real time (Morrow, Ropero-
Miller, Catlin, Winokur, 2018). 
The rapid emergence of new compounds, primarily from Chinese suppliers, makes analytical detection 
difficult and newer techniques such as LC-HRMS invaluable in identifying novel opioids. As specific 
compounds are made illegal new analogs and novel synthetic opioids are emerging onto drug markets at a 
faster pace. Standard immunoassay screening in the clinical setting does not detect synthetic opioids. 
Additionally, very few clinical laboratories offer fentanyl testing in real time (Armenian et al., 2017). 
7.5 Drug-related hospital emergency data  
Every year in Europe, thousands of individuals suffer drug-related acute toxicity that requires hospital 
attendance. Hospital emergency data can provide an insight into acute drug-related harms and the public 
health impact of the use of drugs in Europe.  
 
Drug-related acute toxicity presentations to 32 hospitals in 22 European countries are monitored by the 
European Drug Emergencies Network (Euro-DEN – Euro-DEN Plus; Figure 4). Data on drug-related 
presentations to emergency departments collected by a number of countries allow some national-level 
analysis. A broader, albeit non-representative, European picture is afforded by the work of the Euro-DEN 
Plus network (EMCDDA, 2020b). Findings from the Euro-DEN Plus project help to increase understanding of 
the drugs responsible for acute toxicity in Europe, whether they are illicit substances, misused prescription 
medicines or NPS. 
 
Figure 4: The European Drug Emergencies Network (EMCDDA, 2020b). 
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7.6 Rapid detection by police, customs and border control forces 
Most NPS are identified for the first time following the chemical analysis of a seizure made by law 
enforcement. When a substance is suspected of being an NPS, the national EWS reports this to the 
EMCDDA. This includes chemical and analytical information, as well as the circumstances of the event. The 
submission of analytical data is also required; to a certain extent, such data are substitutes for analytical 
reference standards, which are often not available when an NPS is first detected (EMCCDA, 2019d). 
Europe is confronted with a rapidly evolving drug market. Drugs purchased online can be transported 
across Europe and delivered to consumers by post and parcel services. This creates new challenges for law 
enforcement. Fentanyl's potency is such that a small quantity can be easily shipped directly to buyers 
halfway around the world for a modest fee (Pardo et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 5: Number of different fentanils detected by country reported to the EU Early Warning System, 2017 
(EMCDDA, 2018).  
 
In terms of law enforcement responses, a better understanding of illicit fentanyl production sites and 
supply routes is required. In some cases, the dismantling of illicit production laboratories appears to have 
been effective in ending outbreaks of fentanyl use. This has also been the case in outbreaks in the US 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008). However, if production occurs in neighboring countries 
outside of the EU, for example in Russia, Belarus or the Ukraine, seizures are likely to be more limited and 
laboratories may lie outside Member States' jurisdiction. This will require increased cooperation with third 
countries, border controls and customs authorities (EU Action Against Drugs and Organised Crime, 2017). 
Customs authorities are responsible for the control of goods and chemical products entering the European 
Community market. Customs laboratories are also facing the problem of identification of other type of 
chemicals sold on the "illicit market". As the first rampart in the control of chemicals moving across 
European borders, the role of customs laboratories is of fundamental importance not only from an 
economic point of view but also in the interest of public health and the protection and safety of EU citizens. 
The identification of new substances is a challenge for both forensic and customs laboratories, 
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predominantly due to the absence of scientific data and the lack of reference standards (EU Action Against 
Drugs and Organised Crime, 2017). 
7.7 Monitoring of the Darknet and Clearweb 
The spread of synthetic opioids has been aided by the internet. E-commerce and online shopping allow 
vendors to promote these substances online. Innovations that enhance online privacy (such as Bitcoin and 
anonymous browsing) aid online trade in contraband. These developments have expanded once-limited 
distribution networks, making synthetic opioids accessible to anyone with an internet connection and a 
mailing address, thereby connecting low-level wholesale dealers to international producers in ways that 
bypass traditional drug distribution networks. (Pardo et al., 2019.) 
The internet has changed the drug markets. The darknet has emerged as a key platform to offer all types of 
illicit goods and services. Difficult to the police yet easy to access, the darknet provides an ideal 
environment for the distribution of all types of illicit commodities including drugs, firearms, counterfeit 
goods and fraudulent documents. In addition to the darknet, there are also other marketplaces where 
people can trade illegal substances, such as the clearnet and social media platforms like Snapchat, 
Facebook, and Instagram. 
Law enforcement authorities expect this phenomenon to continue and online markets to expand and, in 
some case, possibly even replace the use of traditional distribution networks by some user demographics. 
While it is recognised that the scope of drug trade on the darknet is expanding and that darknet markets 
have the potential to displace (segments of) existing traditional drug markets in the EU, the overall 
interplay and relationship between the drugs trade via darknet markets and the traditional 'offline' drugs 
trade is still poorly understood (Europol, 2017). 
 
PART 2 SURVEY FINDINGS 
8. Findings from the SO-PREP survey: Existing methods, needs and 
challenges on synthetic opioid preparedness in EU countries 
 
Drug situations – including drug supply, use, public health and social problems, drug policy, and responses – 
vary greatly from country to country. Also the country size, populations, political structures, health care and 
public health systems, and other resources are different in each country. EU Member States need to take 
these factors into consideration when designing and strengthening their national preparedness to new 
public health threats. 
As part of the SO-PREP project, we conducted a survey to explore EU countries' preparedness strategies for 
a potential synthetic opioid crisis. The survey was sent to the EMCDDA Reitox network's national focal 
points (FPs) in July 2020, and responses were received until the end of September 2020. The questionnaire 
comprised 13 questions divided into four areas: monitoring systems, health systems, law enforcement 
preparedness, and rapid communication systems. In the survey, the term ‘synthetic opioids’ referred to any 
(semi-) synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, fentanyl-analogues, prescription opioids, and new synthetic 
opioids (i.e. NPS-opioids).  
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Altogether 19 countries out of 29 (66%) responded to the questionnaire. This means that data are available 
only from about two-thirds of EU countries. The received data are also somewhat limited:   
 Countries that provided only very limited answers were Norway, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Sweden 
and Greece.  
 Partly useful but not comprehensive information was provided by Germany, Czech Republic, and 
Ireland.  
 More comprehensive responses came from the Netherlands, Finland, Cyprus, Lithuania, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary and Poland.  
 
8.1 Monitoring systems 
The first objective of the survey was to explore methods, challenges and shortcomings of rapid data 
collection for detecting the prevalence and use of synthetic opioids, and to discuss how these challenges 
could be addressed. The main national data sources for synthetic opioids monitoring reported by the Reitox 
network Focal Points are: 
 Toxicological/forensic laboratories  
 Syringe residue analysis1 
 Wastewater analysis2  
 The Poison Information Centre 
 Hospital emergency data (e.g. overdose-related emergency department visits) 
 Law enforcement authorities (police, customs and border forces: police and customs drug seizures) 
 Specialized services for people who use drugs  
 Substance use testing (e.g. urine, blood, saliva, hair) 
 Field research  
Challenges in monitoring/diagnostic systems 
There are technical differences between countries in terms of data coverage and detail. For example, in 
Finland, a forensic post-mortem is performed for all deaths related to illegal drugs. This means that the 
cause of death is known, as well as what possible intoxicants were detected in the deceased that might not 
be related to the cause of death. In other countries, such as the Netherlands, autopsies are not always 
carried out, meaning that cases of deaths due to illicit drugs are likely underreported. 
There are also some challenges in coding practices in diagnoses without clear information about substances 
that were used. For example, carfentanyl could be coded under “T40.6  
poisoning by, adverse effect of and underdosing of other and unspecified narcotics”, and thus synthetic 
opioids will be underestimated. Guidance for medical doctors is needed for developing more precise 
                                                          
1 The following countries are involved in ESCAPE-project (syringe residue analysis): UK, Netherlands, France, Hungary and Finland. 
New countries have joined/are joining the European network of syringe drug residue research (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Norway, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Belgium).  Methods used in Syringe drug residue analysis give detailed 
information on the prevalence and changes in drugs used intravenously, as well as mixed use - the simultaneous use of several 
different substances. 
2 Wastewater analysis as a monitoring tool is used in the following countries: Greece, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Italy, 




diagnostics of drug overdoses. Changes in coding practices under ICD-10, as well as structural availability of 
more specific codes, may help to address these deficiencies. 
The provision of common diagnostic guidelines is important for drug-related diagnosing. Common 
guidelines and training for doctors on their use could be provided even by the Reitox focal points. Another 
challenge is the ability of laboratories to identify the substances. 
There is also an obvious need for better and more detailed monitoring of the availability and use of NPS 
(including synthetic opioids) in different populations, including problematic drug users, as well as the 
general population. 
 
8.2 Health systems preparedness 
Most countries did not mention specific preparedness methods or operation models related to health 
systems preparedness. Some focal points mentioned the availability of naloxone3 and the role 
professionals’ training in enhancing the preparedness of health system. 
In the Czech Republic, access to naloxone is highly restricted. Making it available for low-threshold services 
is almost impossible due to the medicine regulatory framework. As we know from other information 
sources (Tammi, Rigoni, Matičič, Schäffer, van der Gouwe, Schiffer, Gayo, Schatz, 2020), the same applies to 
many other European countries, too.  
Portugal has trained health care professionals (doctors and nurses in, for example, emergency care and 
ambulances) on a technical level to deal with increases in the use of synthetic opioids. This included 
trainings in the use of specific guidelines for the injected form of naloxone. 
Health systems preparedness in Finland is currently being developed. Emergency care is preparing for 
changes in the drug market by collecting emergency care reports from the most serious drug overdoses and 
by training and informing personnel on NPS, such as the 'designer' fentanyls in general and carfentanil in 
particular.  
Estonia is one of the European countries where naloxone is widely available. Estonia also has take-home 
naloxone programs for harm reduction and drug treatment centers. Emergency services have been taught 
that fentanyl cases need more naloxone dosages than regular opioid overdose. Since 2018 the synthetic 
opioid cases have decreased a lot, and no new methods have been planned.  
In France, the Health Ministry developed a roadmap (Le ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé, 2019a) on 
preventing and responding to overdoses 2019-2022 with 18 head-actions, subdivided into 46 items. 
(Le ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé, 2019b). One action is to improve and strengthen national and 
local early warning channels. 
 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that the data from the SO-PREP survey is quite limited. For example more countries have naloxone and take 
home naloxone available other than the ones mentioned in this report. More information on the coverage is available at EMCDDA 
and C-EHRN harm reduction monitoring reports.  
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8.3 Law enforcement preparedness 
Most countries have not been planning on implementing any new methods or operation models or 
protocols in the law enforcement sector to prepare for possible increases in synthetic opioids. 
However, in the Netherlands, a special task force has been installed to tackle the issue of prescription 
opioids. It’s a multidisciplinary group developing new guidelines and easy-to-use information for 
stakeholders such as GPs and pharmacists. Concerning to the black market and the Internet, a special 
subgroup of this task force has been established.  
 
The use of synthetic opioids has not been a problem in Portugal. However, the Criminal Police, as the entity 
responsible for the national coordination of the fight against drug trafficking, has been raising awareness 
and informing the various security forces regarding the danger of these substances, in particular concerning 
fentanyl, and has also disseminated the necessary care for its handling and welcomes any training actions 
in this area. 
Several countries reported having safety instructions and guidelines for handling synthetic opioids, fentanyl 
and its derivatives to protect officers. 
One challenge mentioned for law enforcement services is that they would like to have the possibility to 
analyze the product seized in situ, with a more reliable result than Raman or IR technology.  
 
In Finland, so far, neither fentanils nor other synthetic opioids have played a significant role in police 
work. The Finnish customs have found a number of fentanyl derivatives in recent years. However, the 
amounts have been relatively small. European trends in NPS use have often spread to Finland later than to 
other countries, and on a smaller scale.  
 
In the Czech Republic the main shortcoming is that the law enforcement sector is not public health 
oriented.  
In Sweden, the use of new synthetic opioids and fentanyl analogues has decreased drastically in the last 
two years (in 2018 and 2019). There was a decrease in deaths related to fentanyl analogues between 2017 
and 2018. This was probably a consequence of the continuous efforts to classify fentanyl analogs as 
narcotics or goods dangerous to health as well as law enforcement initiatives, such as the prosecution of 
two fentanyl sellers for causing multiple deaths. There was also a lot of media attention on the dangers of 
synthetic opioids such as fentanyl analogues. Nevertheless, it is somewhat difficult to make a joint 
assessment for all synthetic opioids, as some synthetic opioids increased and others decreased. 
Estonia has dealt with an opioid epidemic for nearly two decades. Law enforcement has established a good 
understanding of the synthetic opioid problem and the handling of the substance in seizure procedures and 
expertise.  
 
The French National mission for the control of chemical precursors and the French observatory of 
counterfeit medicines (a sub-division of the national customs) currently hold an important role of 
facilitator/network organizer by hosting regular dedicated meetings on this subject and issuing special 
alerts by emails when necessary. Those alerts are accessible through a specific database. The French local 
point reported that they are not aware of any new implemented methods. 
In Ireland, the main legislation controlling drugs is the Misuse of Drug Acts 1977 to 2019. Due to the 
evolving nature of the drug situation, the drug law has been frequently amended with several 
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supplementations, such as amendments, statutory instruments, and declarations, to include new NPS that 
have emerged on the Irish drug market. 
 
8.4 Rapid communication systems for providing alerts on new drug trends 
 
Most European countries have an EWS; however, their functionality varies and many could benefit from 
improvements. Although many national and European wide drug early warning systems (EWS) exist, none 
of these national systems are designed to identify, risk assess or respond to localized outbreaks of NPS or 
adulterated drug use. For this reason, more detailed planning is needed for coordinating, implementing, 
and reporting on data. The way that the information is made public should also be planned. 
One of the challenges reported is that the national EWS do not provide alerts on new trends in drug use 
because this action is not included in its objectives. In many European countries, there is the awareness 
that synthetic opioids may become a bigger problem, but there has been no need yet for new information 
exchange methods. Of the countries responding to the survey, the following reported a local early warning 
system in place: The Netherlands, Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Norway, Lithuania, Cyprus, 
Finland, Poland and France.  
Poland is a noteworthy example. In case of identifying a potentially dangerous substance or an increase in 
the number of seizures of a potentially dangerous substance, all the network laboratories and heads of 
harm reduction programs receive the information on a potential threat. The data is also sent to Sanitary 
Inspection, which has a leading role in controlling NPS. In cases of a further increase in the risk of particular 
substances, the Ministry of Health is informed, and the information is published officially. In some cases, 
the decision is made to make information public at an earlier stage. 
The information addressed to people who use drugs is mostly transferred with the help of harm reduction 
programs, which conduct their tasks directly in the population of drug users. This information might be 
case-based or more general in character. In Poland, 2018, a short leaflet was prepared with information on 
potential risk of synthetic opioids and recommendations on how to behave in case of drug poisoning and 
how to avoid poisoning. 
If the use of synthetic opioids increases in Europe, rapid communication and exchange of information are 
crucial. Four countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary) taking part in the survey did not 
respond or said that they have no plans or they were not aware of new additional models or methods of 
preparedness if potent synthetic opioids were to appear on the market. Nevertheless, preparing for such an 
event was considered very important. However, some countries, such as Italy, for example, have already 
made such preparations. Italy has improved its own Rapid Alert System, including a collaborative network 
of experts from all the disciplinary areas envisaged (from forensic toxicology to hospital emergency services 
to territorial services for drug addiction). This network uses data derived from research and data from the 
Ministry of the Interior relating to seized substances as well as analysis of wastewater. The main challenge 
reported is that the territorial collaborative system will still need years before being fully operational. Italy 
also aims to develop methods of data integration to better understanding the drug situation. 
France has planned to develop a mobile application that could be used to report on the emergence of new 
drugs, but it is still under preparation. 
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The use of synthetic opioids has not been a problem in Portugal. However, as the entity responsible for the 
national coordination of the fight against drug trafficking, the Criminal Police has been raising awareness 
and informing the various security forces regarding the danger of these substances, particularly with regard 
to fentanyl, and has disseminated the necessary care for its handling. Several countries reported that any 
training actions in this area are welcome. 
In France, The French Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (OFDT) publishes information if 
there is a national threat. The National Public Health Agency and the Public Health Ministry can post about 
such national threats as well. Often, as drug signals vanish quickly, this is done in the frame of the "drug 
signal process" to display alerts at the local level (city or region), through specialized services and notably 
with the support of NGOs using social networks to inform users quickly. NGOs can also take responsibility 
and lead such publications.  
 
PART 3 GOOD PRACTICES AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
9. Examples of good practices on synthetic opioid preparedness 
 
In addition to information from the SO-PREP survey, two other examples of good practices on synthetic 
opioid preparedness at the national level were identified4 . These good practices are from Public Health 
England and Sweden. 
 
9.1 Public Health England 
Public Health England (PHE) is an executive agency of the Department of Health and Social Care in the 
United Kingdom. Public Health England (PHE) exists to protect and improve the nation's health and 
wellbeing and reduce health inequalities.   
It does this through world-class science, knowledge and intelligence, advocacy, partnerships and the 
delivery of specialist public health services. PHE is an operationally autonomous executive agency of the 
Department of Health. PHE published in May 2018 guidance for local areas on planning to deal with 
fentanyl or another potent opioid. 
According to PHE, local areas should: 
 plan for how they will rapidly understand and assess the risk of any future threat, develop plans in 
partnership, and respond to the threat 
 do everything they can now to review their arrangements and minimize the potential future impact of 
potent opioids (for example, through naloxone provision, treatment access and an effective local drug 
information system) 
Many of the principles and activities could be applied to incidences of other unusually potent drugs. They 
will also be relevant to several settings such as prisons and other secure settings. 
                                                          
4 The examples were mentioned by a national expert in an interview for another SO-PREP report.  
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9.1.1 Plan and prepare for a future threat 
Local areas should work through existing mechanisms for emergency preparation, response and recovery 
to develop a plan that can be enacted quickly in the event of an incident. This may benefit from working 
with or through the local resilience forum and local health resilience partnership. 
The plan should enable local partners to rapidly: 
 understand the scale of the threat and assess the risk 
 communicate the threat 
 take actions to mitigate the threat 
9.1.2 Understand the scale of the threat and assess the risk 
 Local areas will want to understand rapidly: 
 where the problem is: particular neighborhoods, is it widespread or in neighboring authorities 
 who is affected: which users and how many 
 the severity of the problem: deaths or non-fatal overdoses or other reported harm 
 the timing: is the threat imminent or occurring now 
The relevant information might come from: 
 the local drug information system (LDIS) and professional information network (PIN) or if there is no 
local PIN, directly from member organization such as the police and drug services 
 drug testing of service users, drug samples seized or handed in, or post-mortem biological samples 
9.1.3 Communicate the threat 
The threat will need to be communicated to specialized drug treatment services and other services and to 
people who use drugs. Communications should cover: What is known about the problem, safer drug use 
messages and where to go for help at the local level. 
9.1.4 Take actions to mitigate the threat 
Assessing risk and impact will determine what measures are needed to address the problem. There should 
be a clear incident response plan developed locally that includes operational continuity and a risk 
assessment. Incident response planning is likely to include reviewing existing provisions and processes that 
could mitigate the threat and inform the consideration of what more can be done in each area.  
9.1.5 The effectiveness of the local drug information system; Drug alerts 
Media reports and other warnings regarding novel, potent, adulterated or contaminated drugs have 
increased over the last decade. However, these reports are often inaccurate, rarely confirmed by toxicology 
tests and may sometimes be counterproductive to public health messages intended to reduce drug-related 
harms and deaths. An agreed local drug information system (LDIS) that uses consistent and efficient 
processes for sharing and assessing information, and issuing warnings where needed, can help ensure high-
quality; effective information rapidly reaches the right people.  
PHE is working closely with the National Crime Agency, The Home Office, police, coroners, pathologists, 
toxicologists and laboratories to improve the timeliness and accuracy of the data received, particularly the 
data on deaths where fentanyl might be a factor. (Public Health England, Guidance for local areas on 




9.2 Rise and decline in fentanyl and fentanyl analog related deaths in Sweden 
The presence of fentanyl and its derivatives on the Swedish drug market since 2014 is considered to be 
among the most serious developments that have affected Sweden's drug-using population. Since 2015, 
these synthetic opioids have even surpassed heroin in the number of drug-related deaths. In order to tackle 
this issue, the Swedish authorities introduced a raft of measures using a multi-agency approach. These 
initiatives included prioritizing the investigation of fentanyl derivatives by the Public Health Agency of 
Sweden and proposals the need for regulation of new substances including fentanyl derivatives to be 
considered as goods dangerous to health or as narcotics. As a result, control measures were adopted on 
two occasions, in 2017 and in 2018 (The Swedish Police Authority, 2018). 
The National Forensic Centre developed procedures for safe handling of the substances and 
a multidisciplinary team was established to reduce drug-related mortality by making naloxone available. 
Other measures included a new provision enabling the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the Medical 
Product Agency to purchase samples of substances under consideration for regulation in order to analyse 
and chemically identify those substances. In terms of the law enforcement response, the strategy included 
knowledge support, international and interagency cooperation, crime prevention measures, informing 
regulatory responses and initiating investigations. Such investigations mainly targeted the sale and 
distribution of fentanyl and derivatives online. The Swedish market differs from those of most other EU 
countries and those in North America, in that it is almost entirely online-based for synthetic opioids as 
opposed to "traditional" street-level sales. Epidemics of overdoses and deaths in countries other than 
Sweden typically occur locally and regionally, depending on where the street-level drug-sales take place 
(The Swedish Police Authority, 2018). 
In Sweden, the sale of illicit fentanyl and its derivatives takes place almost exclusively on the internet. 
Based on police information gathered since 2014, an estimated 300 of the 370 deaths related to fentanyl or 
its derivatives in Sweden can be traced back to internet purchases. The limited number of Swedish vendors 
implies that a small number of vendors appear to be behind the availability of fentanyl and its derivatives. 
Such vendors became the focus of investigations. In a judgment in such a case in May 2018, two vendors 
who had sold fentanyl analogues were convicted to prison for causing another’s death by selling fentanyl 
analogues that caused the deaths of eight individuals. 
The trade may move to darknet markets as a result of intensive repressive measures against open sale 
online. However, the Swedish police believe that such a move would limit public exposure by reducing 
accessibility to these substances (The Swedish Police Authority, 2018). According to the Swedish policy, the 
combination of the aforementioned measures seems to have been effective, as can be seen in the 
decreasing numbers of calls to the poison information center and cases of fentanyl and fentanyl-derivatives 
in post-mortem toxicology cases over the course of 2018. 
Since February 2018, all major known actors have stopped trading in fentanyl analogs in Sweden, although 
a more restricted and covert trade is still there. There are a number of reason why the sale of fentanyl 
analogs has decreased so much: the Chinese government banned the production and sale of fentanyl and 
many of its derivates in May 2019 the aforementioned involuntary manslaughter conviction, and the police 
measures taken against drug-related criminal activities and actors. Of the limited number of actors, only a 
handful have sold major amounts of fentanyl analogs and only one of the actors has been active for more 
than two years. This means that only a few actors are behind a large number of deaths. Some of the actors 
have a long history of drug-related offenses.  
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In 2016 and 2017, the police carried out two nation-wide operations for preventive purposes against 
buyers of fentanyl analogues in Sweden. During these operations, the police conducted several house calls, 
which revealed the vast need for social interventions. In connection with the interventions, several 
individuals were offered access to provided substance abuse treatment. 
The prevalence of fentanyl analogs in Sweden is dependent on international developments. The analogs 
originate mainly from China. There is a risk that the Swedish Police's active work in reducing the nationally 
based online-trade in fentanyl and their analogs will increase Swedish users' interest in buying from foreign 
websites instead. The ongoing development of the prevalence of fentanyl analogues in Sweden therefore 
needs to be assessed in relation to a possible change of the legal position, to the authorities' continued 
directed work, and to international developments. Examples of the latter are the measures that China will 
take to reduce the production in the country. Currently, the prevalence of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues 
constitutes a minor part of the total Swedish drug market. At the same time, there are indications of a still 
growing opioids market controlled by an increasing number of actors (The Swedish Police Authority, 2018). 
Identified needs by The Swedish Police Authority (2018): 
 Proactive classification procedures 
 Increased inspection of the mail flow 
 The need of tougher inspections of international drug trade 
 The Swedish Chemicals Agency needs to prioritize fentanyl analogues and ensure that the 
analogues are entered into the list of the agency's monitored chemicals/substances 
 Increased knowledge about the dangers associated with fentanyl analogues 
 Reinforcement of the legislation covering counterfeit pharmaceutical products 
 Increased knowledge about the dangers associated with fentanyl analogues  
 
10. Conclusions and recommendations on synthetic opioid preparedness 
in European countries 
 
Investing in enhanced synthetic opioid monitoring and response capacity in Europe is crucial, particularly 
against the backdrop of the drug overdose crises experienced by the United States and Canada. With the 
rapidly changing drug markets and ever-growing number of new synthetic opioids, countries need to be 
vigilant and would benefit from developing multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary preparedness plans. A 
review of the literature shows that plenty of effective tools are available to enhance national synthetic 
opioid preparedness. 
On the basis of what has been presented in this report, we identified a set of conclusions and 
recommendations. The findings cover rapid information exchange, early warning systems, health systems 




Rapid information exchange 
1. Many European countries have shortcomings in the rapid exchange of information. The main challenge is 
to strengthen the cooperation, systematic data collection and information exchange across all relevant 
partners. There is a need for national databases and digital platforms for rapid data exchange. Moreover, 
the coordination, implementation, evaluation and reporting of data should be enhanced.  
2. Reaching potential synthetic opioid users with the right information through the appropriate channels is 
a challenge. Certain groups of drug users are difficult to reach. There is a need for rapid information sharing 
among at-risk groups, such as in low-threshold services or ‘housing first’ units. One option could be digital 
interventions, such as the use of 'apps', for alerting people who use drugs about highly potent or 
potentially harmful substances, adulterants, substances sold under a different name, or fake medication. 
3. Information should also be disseminated to the public and all relevant stakeholders, such as health care 
professionals, first responders, and law enforcement officers. Educating relevant individuals who may come 
in contact with people who use synthetic opioids is important to enhance response capacity at the 
individual level. 
Early Warning Systems  
4. Although national, European and even global Early Warning Systems (EWS) exist for drugs, these systems 
can benefit from further improvements. It is important that the systems are agile and responsive to the 
threats and not hindered by bureaucracy. Moreover, the right stakeholders who have first-hand 
information about new drugs, need to be able to contribute to the EWS. Furthermore, EWS should be 
designed to be able to respond to localized outbreaks of harmful or adulterated (synthetic) opioids.  
5. As part of EWS, there is also a need to develop and strengthen real-time alert protocols within European 
countries to be able to communicate risks from hazardous synthetic opioids as soon as they are found in 
circulation. Depending on the severity and scope of the situation, the alerts may be local, regional or 
national, and their target audiences may include people who use drugs, health workers, harm reduction 
services, law enforcement and other relevant populations. 
Health systems preparedness 
6. Data from emergency services and hospitals can help detect the emergence of harmful substances on 
the drug market as well as increases in the use of harmful substances. Information on the use of synthetic 
opioids is generally not mentioned in emergency department or hospital databases. This should be 
addressed with the creation of new databases, as well as better coding practices such that specific 
substances can be entered in databases with specific codes.  
7. Information from users and low-threshold services such as drug consumption rooms should be a vital 
part of the preparedness system. This can provide rapid on-site information about new or harmful synthetic 
opioids, or bad batches of drugs. Platforms for the collection of user-level information may be considered. 
8. Given that the first wave of the opioid epidemic started with increased prescribing of opioids, there is 
also a clear need for continuous and systematic monitoring of the over-prescription of opioids, as well as 




Law enforcement  
9. One of the challenges in the law enforcement sector is the long waiting time for forensic expertise. Some 
forensic analyses of synthetic opioid samples take more than a month, which may be too long if there are 
local outbreaks of a substance.  
10. There are handheld spectroscopy devices (using Raman or infrared technology) that are able to identify 
synthetic opioids on-site. This detection technology needs to be developed and taken into wider use for 
synthetic opioids.  
11. Finally, there is a need to obtain more accurate information on drug-related deaths and their exact 
causes in order to be able to better understand and tackle overdose outbreaks. This includes strengthening 
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Appendix: SO-PREP survey to the Reitox national focal points 
 
Preparedness for a Synthetic Opioid crisis 
In Europe, highly potent synthetic opioids (SOs) and related overdoses are a growing health threat. SO-
PREP is a two-year European project focused on strengthening health systems’ preparedness to timely 
and effectively respond to increases in the prevalence, use and harms of Synthetic Opioids. 
The aim of SO-PREP is to contribute to the enhancement of the SO-related preparedness of the European 
Member States to effectively monitor and respond to SO-related health risks, hazards, and harms.  
The objectives of the project are to: 
• gain a better understanding of the current use and trends of Synthetic Opioids and related health 
needs in Europe 
• strengthen national health systems’ synthetic opioid preparedness 
• develop an evidence-based toolkit for implementing enhanced SO monitoring and response 
capacity  
SO-PREP is coordinated by the Trimbos Institute (NL) and the project partners are: 
• Correlation—European Harm Reduction Network (NL) 
• Estonian National Institute for Health Development (TAI) 
• Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) 
• Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences (DE) 
• Ghent University (BE) 
THL (Finnish institute for Health and Welfare) is collecting information of existing practices of national SO-
PREPAREDNESS, EU-wide by conducting a questionnaire to Reitox network. 
Preparedness for a Synthetic Opioid crisis 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to explore existing national strategies and models of preparedness for 
dealing with a potential synthetic opioid crisis in Europe.  
The term ‘preparedness’ refers to the ability of governments, professionals, and communities to anticipate 
and respond effectively to a potential or current spread of synthetic opioids in order to timely and effectively 
protect people from harm. 




1. PLEASE ENTER YOUR CONTACT INFORMATION: 









2. What methods of rapid data collection for detecting the use of synthetic opioids (or for other 
drugs/substances) are currently being used in your country? These might include forensic institutes and 
relevant laboratories, causes of death, substance use testing (e.g. urine, blood, saliva, hair), driving under 
the influence, police and customs drug seizures, syringe residue analysis, wastewater analysis, hospital 




















5. Are you currently planning on implementing additional methods to detect possible increases in synthetic 
opioid use?  
 
 
6. What preparedness methods/operation models or protocols are currently being used in the law 
enforcement sector (e.g. Police, Customs, Border Forces, others) to prepare for possible increases in the 
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use of synthetic opioids (e.g. law enforcement guidelines, Intelligence programs)? Are you currently 
planning on implementing new methods? 
 
 
7. What are some of the challenges or shortcomings in preparedness in the law enforcement sector? How 
could these challenges and shortcomings be addressed? 
 
 
8. What preparedness methods/operation models are currently being used in health care services (e.g. 
emergency care, ambulance) to prepare and respond to possible increases in the use of synthetic opioids 




9. What are some of the challenges or shortcomings in preparedness in health care services? How could 




The following questions refer to the rapid flow of information that occurs when possible increases in the 
use of synthetic opioids are detected or when there are changes in the drug market. 
 
10. Do you have any rapid communication systems and early warning systems place to provide alerts on 





11. Who are the relevant partners and authorities involved in communications and warnings of potential 
increases in synthetic opioid use? 
 
 
12. What kind of information and early warning channels are there to inform people who use drugs? 
 
 
13. Are the new methods of information exchange being developed with regard to synthetic opioids? 
 
 
14. What are challenges or shortcomings of current information exchange methods? How could these 
challenges and shortcomings be addressed? 
 
 
 
 
 
